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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
may address some motion, demurrer or denial." Consequently notice of appearance
cannot be a pleading within Rule 1 (2) as it asserts no claim or defense.
Amendment to the General Rules of the Superior Courts.-Rule 16-New Trial.
Superior Court Rule 16, 34A Wn.2d 131, was amended to delete the "denying" part of
the paragraph following subdivision 9. [144 Wash. Dec. No. 23 (effective July 1,
1954).] As the rule now stands, the trial court must give definite reasons of law and
fact when it grants a motion for a new trial. If the court denies a motion for a new
trial, there is no longer the requirement of stating its reasons in the denying order. The
desirability of deleting the "denying" part was pointed out in 29 WASH. L. Rv. 145-147
(1954).
Amendment to the Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure-Rule 44-Abroga-
tion of Certain Statutes. A new rule was adopted to the Rules of Pleading, Practice
and Procedure. Rule 44, 145 Wash. Dec. No. 9 (effective September 1, 1954). Rules of
Pleading, Practice and Procedure 26 through 37, 34A Wn.2d 84 et seq., adopting the
federal rules governing discovery, involved a major change from the statutory discovery
procedures. Notwithstanding RCW 2.04.200, which declares all laws in conflict with
rules of court are of no further effect, there has been some confusion by continuing to
apply the statutory discovery procedures. See 29 WASH. L. REv. 143 (1954). Rule 44
clarifies precisely which sections of RCW are rendered ineffective by the discovery
procedures in Rules 26 through 37.
PROPERTY
Real Property - Easements - Easement by Implied Reservation.
Adams v. Cullen' established for the first time the validity in Washing-
ton of easements by implied reservation. A driveway had been con-
structed to serve both a residence adjacent to the street and the
residence behind. Both residences were upon the same tract of land,
held by a single owner. The driveway had been used for both resi-
dences for many years. The quasi-servient tenement, adjacent to the
street, was conveyed to the defendant prior to the plaintiff's acquisition
of the rear property. Construction of another driveway for the plain-
tiff's premises would have entailed grading a 45 foot incline to the
street below, a project of considerable expense. Plaintiff was held to
possess an easement by implied reservation in the driveway across the
defendant's land.
Following previous decisions on implied easements,2 the court re-
stated the three requirements: unity of title and subsequent separa-
tion; an apparent and continuous quasi-easement during unity of title;
and a certain degree of necessity. The court then pointed out that
"Unity of title and subsequent separation is an absolute requirement.
144 Wn.2d 502, 268 P.2d 451 (1954).2 Bailey v. Hennessey, 112 Wash. 45, 191 Pac. 863 (1920) ; Wreggit v. Porterfield,
36 Wn.2d 638, 219 P.2d 589 (1950) ; Silver v. Strohm, 39 Wn.2d 1, 234 P.2d 481 (1951).
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The second and third characteristics are aids to construction in deter-
mining the cardinal consideration-the presumed intention of the
parties as disclosed by the extent and character of the user, the-nature
of the property, and the relation of the separated parts to each other.
... The presence or absence of either or both of these requirements is
not necessaril conclusive" However that may be, no case in Wash-
ington has found an implied easement without the, presence of both
necessity and prior use in some degree. It is difficult to conceive, a
construction of the presumed intention of the parties without these
factors. Such a situation would seemingly require evidence of express
intention of the parties, and there would be no problem of implied
easements. The possibility which might- be inferred from the last
sentence above quoted, that an implied easement might be established
without the two latter characteristics, is clouded by the ever-present
question in these cases of just how much necessity is required. This
appears to be a variable factor dependent upon the facts of each indi-
vidual case. Certain standards have been established, however. For
an implied grant, the rule is certain: reasonable necessity must be
proved. It would appear that there is no practical reason for concern
as to which estate was first conveyed; but. it is traditional to construe
implications in deeds in favor of the grantee, upon the presumption
that a fee simple has passed. Since an implied reservation is in deroga-
tion of a fee, it must overcome thispresumption. Implied grants benefit
from such a presumption. Therefore, a greater degree of necessity is
required for implied reservations. Courts have adopted at least three
different views upon this matter. Probably a majority require strict
necessity,' a position which was approved by dicta in previous Wash-
ington cases.6 A- few courts have simplified the matter by eliminating
any distinction between implied grants and reservations, requiring
reasonable necessity for either In the Adams case, Washington has
adopted the middle ground which was established in a leading Kansas
decision.' "In the absence of other considerations, a higher degree of
8 Note 1 supra at 505, 268 P2d at 453 (Italics added).
'Bailey v. Hennessey, note 2 supra.
5 See Notes, 34 A.L.R. 233 (1925); 100 A.L.R. 1327 (1936); 164 A.L.R. 1007
(1946).6 Schumacher v. Brand, 12 Wash. 543, 130 Pac. 1145 (1913) ; Cogswell v. Cogswell,
81 Wash. 315, 142 Pac. 665 (1914); Davison v. Columbia Lodge, 90 Wash. 461, 154
Pac. 383 (1916).7 Jasper v. Worcester Spinning & Finishing Co., 318 Mass. 752, 64 N.E2d 89
(1945); Jennings v. Lineberry, 180 Va. 44, 21 S.E2d 769 (1942); Provident Mut. L.
Ins. Co. v. Doughty, 126 N.J. Eq. 262, 8 A2d 722 (1939).8 Van Sandt v. Royster, 148 Kan. 495, 83 P.2d 698 (1938).
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necessity is needed ... , 2" The court has embraced the rule of the
Restatement" in weighing several factors, principally that of prior
use. Evidence of prior use, according to the Restatement, may supple-
ment the necessity and also aid in establishing the presumed intention
of the parties. The greater the prior use, the less extra necessity is
required for an implied reservation. Following this rule in the Adams
case, it was held that continuous prior use, combined with the necessity
shown and the conveyee's knowledge of the prior use was sufficient
proof to establish an easement by implied reservation.
So long as a differentiation is made between implied grants and
reservations, the position taken by the court appears to be preferable
to the older view that strict necessity is required for implied reserva-
tions. The rule of the Restatement is flexible and will embrace divers
fact situations with an eye toward equity. But it would be reasonable
speculation that failure to prove either necessity or prior use would be
fatal to a party claiming an implied easement, whether by grant or
reservation. The lack of conclusiveness probably applies to the degree
of each characteristic, rather than to its presence or absence as was
indicated by the court. Assuming that failure to prove prior use would
be fatal, the claiming party might still avail himself of a statutory right-
of-way by necessity," with its accompanying disadvantage of requir-
ing compensation.
The Adams case greatly clarifies Wreggit v. Porterfield,"2 which had
been interpreted as possibly denying the validity of implied reserva-
tions in this state. Their existence and validity is now recognized,
and the rule appears to be that generally a higher degree of necessity
is required for them than for implied grants. How the other state-
ments of the court will be interpreted in a borderline case cannot safely
be predicted, but there are indications that an equitable and flexible
disposition will result in implied easement cases hereafter.
Real Property-Eminent Domain-Condemnation of Public Prop-
erty. In State ex rel. Eastvold v. Superior Court," the state sought
9 Note 1 supra at 508, 268 P2d at 454.
10 5 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 476 (1944).
11 RCW 8.24.020.
12 Note 2 supra. The Wreggit case was an unsuccessful attempt to establish an
easement by implied grant upon facts of reservation, counsel apparently believing that
reservations were not valid in Washington. There was little showing of either necessity
or prior use. The court held this failure of proof to be fatal to the claiming party.
1- Note, The Implied Easement and Way of Necessity in Washington, 26 WASH.
L. REv. 125 (1951).
14 44 Wn.2d 607, 269 P.2d 560 (1954).
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to condemn a drainage district's right of way for limited access high-
way purposes. The state relied upon RCW 47.52.050, which provides
that private or public property may be acquired for limited access
facilities.15 The court held that the term "public property" as used in
the statute means property owned by some public body, not property
in the public domain, as such, which is not devoted to public use.
Accordingly, under the statute the state may condemn property owned
by municipal corporations and in public use, and it was error to dismiss
the state's petition.
Several distinct situations may arise involving the condemnation of
public property. They involve at least four separate entities which
possess a power of eminent domain: the privately owned public utility,
the municipality or municipal corporation, the county and the state
itself. At least eight different combinations of these competing parties
have presented the problem to the Washington court. These situations
are illustrated as follows. (1) It is well settled that a municipal
corporation may condemn and take property of a privately owned
public utility corporation, where the property is taken for the same
public use. (2) The state may condemn property of a privately
owned public service corporation for the same or for a different public
use.' (3) One public service corporation may condemn property of
another such corporation where the property has not been put to the
public use for which it is sought, and the new public use will not inter-
fere with the existing use s This situation may be distinguished by
the fact that it is actually private condemnation of private property.
(4) Presumably, a privately owned public service corporation deriving
15 RCW 47.52.050 provides that '... the highway authorities of the state, counties,
and incorporated cities and towns, respectively, or in cooperation with the other, may
acquire private or public property and property rights for limitid access facilities and
service roads ... in the same manner as such authorities are now or hereafter may be
authorized by law to acquire property or property rights in connection with highways
and streets within their respective jurisdictions." The authorized manner of con-
detonation is found in RCW 47.12.010.
16 State ex rel. Peabody v. Superior Court, 77 Wash. 593, 139 Pac. 277 (1914)
(electric railway); State ex rel. Washington Water Power Co. v. Superior Court,
8 Wn2d 122, 11 P.2d 577 (1941) (franchises, plants, lines and facilities of electric
power producer) ; State ex rel. Northwestern Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 28 Wn2d
476, 183 P.2d 802 (1947) (electric power plant, on the theory that use of a public
utility by a municipal corporation is larger in scope and of more general benefit to the
public.); See Note, 2 WAsH. L. REV. 201 (1927).
17 State ex reL Bremerton Bridge Co. v. Superior Court, 194 Wash. 7, 76 P.2d 990
(1938) ; WAsH. CONST. Art. XII, § 10 provides that this power of eminent domain
over corporations shall not be abridged.
28 Samish River Boom Co. v. Union Boom Co., 32 Wash. 586, 73 Pac. 670 (1903);
State ex reL. Washington Boom Co. v. Chehalis Boom Co., 82 Wash. 509, 144 Pac. 719
(1914) ; State ex rel. South Fork Log Driving Co. v. Superior Court, 102 Wash. 460,
173 Pac. 192 (1918) ; State ex ret. Mason County Power Co. v. Superior Court, 99
Wash. 496, 169 Pac. 994 (1918).
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power of eminent domain from the state may condemn property of a
municipality. However, a specific grant of such power may be neces-
sary. This was the implication of one case,"9 where property had been
granted to a city upon condition subsequent to be used only for park
purposes. A railroad attempted to condemn a portion of the park.
Condemnation was denied, the court holding that the land was deemed
to be held in trust for park purposes, and the power to divert it to an
inconsistent public use must be specially conferred. It was not made
entirely clear whether the requirement covered both parties or only
the city. ° (5) Municipal corporations have been allowed to condemn
state land which was not in public use.2 (6) In two cases, state land
which was in public use was condemned by a municipal corporation
for another public use. The court held that such action was within
the power of eminent domain of the municipal corporation, so long as
the new public use would not interfere with the existing public use of
the state.2 (7) In State ex rel. Cle Elum v. Kittitas County," the
county sought to condemn, for road purposes, a right of way across
property held and used by the city as a site for a reservoir. Condemna-
tion was denied, the court holding that such a power must be expressly
conferred by statute, and will not be inferred from a general power of
eminent domain. (8) The state may condemn property of a municipal
corporation for an inconsistent public use, where the power to acquire
"public" property is conferred by statute. This was the holding in
State ex rel. Eastvold v. Superior Court."
Several questions remain unanswered by the foregoing cases. Must
the state have specific statutory authority to condemn public property
in public use? If so, it may be doubted if such property may be taken
for ordinary highway purposes, due to different wording used in the
regular highway statutes from that used in the limited access provi-
sions.25 Some federal cases suggest that the requirement of specific
statutory authorization is restricted to the exercise of eminent domain
29 State ex rel. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Superior Court, 136 Wash. 87, 238 Pac.
985 (1925).
20 In Powell v. Walla Walla, 64 Wash. 582, 117 Pac. 389 (1911), it was held that
a city could not devote property purchased by it for use as a park to the improvement
of an adjoining street. Such power must be specially conferred.21 Tacoma v. State, 121 Wash. 448, 209 Pac. 700 (1922).22 Tacoma v. State, note 21 supra; Roberts v. Seattle, 63 Wash. 573, 116 Pac. 25
(1911), where university property was taken by the city for street purposes. RCW
28.77.300 now prohibits exercise of eminent domain against certain university property.
23 107 Wash. 326, 173 Pac. 698 (1919).
24 Supra note 14.
25 RCW 47.12.010 provides for the acquisition of "any property... necessary" for
highway purposes. Compare RCW 47.52.0.0: "private or public property."
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by a municipality or other donee of the sovereign, and has fio applica-
tion to the sovereign itself."8 This reasoning is also implied in the princi-
pal case.
Regardless of the source of its power, when the state is allowed to
condemn public property in public use, must the state have a superior
public use in store for the property sought? The court has often held
that in eminent domain proceedings, selection of the land to be con-
demned by the proper administrative official is conclusive in the
absence of bad faith, or arbitrary, capricious or fraudulent action. 7
This conclusiveness is codified in the highway statutes." Is such bad
faith, etc., the only test of the utility or preference of the new public
use over the old? In State ex rel. Puget Sound & Baker River R. Co. v
Joiner9 appears this dicta: "... . where property devoted to public use
is sought for a superior public use, the right to condemn such property
must be exercised as not to substantially interfere with the prior use."
This doctrine has been followed only in situations (3) and (6) above.
Some courts have held that property presently devoted to public use
cannot be taken by eminent domain for another and wholly different
public use unless the new use is necessary to the public welfare.8" Even
this test may be unsatisfactory where either use is necessary to the
public welfare. It would require judicial determination of public wel-
fare. On the other hand, planning and land allocation is properly a
legislative function, since the broad scope of the problem can be
treated where the courts must decide individual cases. Specific statu-
tory authorization to condemn "public" property is a form of legisla-
tive determination of superior public uses, and perhaps is more definite
in application than any judicial test of public welfare or convenience.
Conflict between public and private uses of property has long pre-
sented difficult problems to the courts. Conflict between different public
uses of land appears to be an inevitable growing field of controversy
accompanying the growth of public ownership of all types of public
facilities. Where legislatures have not acted for allocation between
28 United States v. Sixty Acres, More or Less, 28 F.Supp. 718 (Ill. 1939) ; United
States v. Parcel of Land, 32 F.Supp. 368 (Del. 1940).
27 State ex rel. Puget Sound & Baker River R. Co. v. Joiner, 182 Wash. 301,47 P.2d
14 (1935) ; State ex rel. St. Paul & Tacoma Lmbr. Co. v. Dawson, 25 Wn.2d 499, 171
P.2d 189 (1946) ; State ex rel. Hunter v. Superior Court, 34 Wn.2d 214, 208 P.2d 866(1949) ; State ex rel. Church v. Superior Court, 40 Wn.2d 90, 240 P.2d 1208 (1952).
28 RCW 47.12,010.
2 9 Supra note 27 at 302, 47 P.2d at 15 (1935).
80 Oklahoma City v. Local Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 192 Okla.* 188, 134 P2d
565 (1943); Denver v. Board of Commissioners, 113 Colo. 150, 156 P2d 101 (1945).
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public uses, the conceivable tasks of the courts in balancing public
interests may be great.
Real Property-Adverse Possession-Proof of Intent to Claim Ad-
versely. In O'Brien v. Schultz,8 1 plaintiff and defendant were possessed
of adjoining quarter sections of land. About 1900, a fence had been
erected to divide the two quarters. This fence did not follow the true
boundary line, and included some 3.7 acres of defendant's land with
the quarter section belonging to plaintiff. Each party farmed up to
the fence. The fence was removed about 1916, leaving a visible ridge
which was treated as the boundary for the next ten years. During
part of this latter period, a tenant farmed both parcels, dividing the
crop at the ridge. In 1927 a new fence was built upon the ridge by the
plaintiff's tenant. This remained until 1945, when a period of con-
tention began as to the true boundary, defendant and plaintiff alter-
nately destroying each other's crops and moving the fence. A similar
dispute arose over part of an abandoned road which the plaintiff's
tenant had fenced and farmed for at least ten years.
On cross-examination, the plaintiff's tenant testified that neither
he nor the plaintiff wanted any land which was not the plaintiff's; that
they only wanted the land which plaintiff actually owned. The trial
court thereupon dismissed the action and the plaintiff appealed. The
supreme court held that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case
and reversed for a new trial, saying, "There is no magic formula by
which a claim of titie by adverse possession may be defeated by draw-
ing from the claimant an admission that originally he did not intend to
take any land beyond his boundaries."32 The plaintiff's actions were
held to have spoken louder than his words; his acts in exercising full
domination and control over the disputed strip and taking crops from
the land to the purported boundary evinced his intention to claim as
owner, and his declarations that he did not intend to claim defendant's
land did not prove lack of intention. There is no premium upon evil
intent. "An express declaration of intention to claim adversely is not
necessary to initiate the running of the statutory period nor to support
an action . . .," the court pointed out, then stating that "Nothing said
in either Brown v. Hubbard,.. . nor in Beck v. Loveland, ... changed,
or was intended to change, the foregoing rule.""
31 145 Wash. Dec. 717, 278 P.2d 322 (1954).
32 Id. at 726, 278 P.2d at 328.
33 Ibid. (Italics added.)
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Beck v. Loveland" was easily distinguished, since the claimant in
that case had known that the fence in question was not the true
boundary and had agreed to treat it as temporary, pending a survey.
Brown v. Hubbard" presented a more difficult task of distinction.
There, the claimant had planted a hedge and piled rocks haphazardly
upon what she thought was the true boundary. Twelve years later,
she had declared that she would vacate the strip. It was held that the
claimant did not have sufficient intent to claim adversely. That de-
cision had appeared to hold the declarations as controlling, and to
imply a requirement of evil intent." In the O'Brien case the court
points out-that "We did not, in that case [Brown v. Hubbard], consider
as controlling the testimony of plaintiff and his-predecessoK that they
did not intend to claim anything beyond the true boundary. Indeed,
we could not have done so inasmuch as in three earlier decisions we
had held that almost identical language did not, by itself, prove a lack
of intention to claim title by adverse possession." ... The real basis
of our opinion was that we could not find on the whole record that the
evidence preponderated against the findings. . .. "I'
This case then makes it clear that Brown v., Hubbard did not change
the law of adverse possession in any respect. Intention to claim prop-
erty adversely may still be proved by acts and declarations, with acts
most, frequently controlling. "If his acts clearly evince an intention
to claim another's land as its owner, a general declaration by the user
that he did not intend to claim another's land will not prove lack of
intention. But a specific declaration by ,a user that he knew a fence
was not the boundary and that he agreed to. consider it as a temporary
barrier will prove lack of intention. Beck v. Loveland, supra. And if
his acts are equivocal or do not clearly evince his intention to claim as
owner, his declarations that he did not intend to take another's land,
though not conclusive proof of lack of intention, may be considered in
determining his intention while using the land. Brown v. Hubbard,
supra." 9
The O'Brien case is a landmark in Washington law of adverse pos-
84 37 Wn.2d 249, 222 P2d 1066 (1950).
85 42 Wn2d 867, 259 P2d 391 (1953).
86 See Note, 29 WAsH. L. REv. 154 (1954).
V Citing Mittet v. Hansen, 178 Wash. 541, 35 P.2d 93 (1934) ; Johnson v. Ingram,
63 Wash. 554, 115 Pac. 1073 (1911); Schlossmacher v. Beacon Place Co., 52 Wash.
588, 100 Pac. 1013 (1909).
s 145 Wash. Dec. at 725, 278 P.2d at 328.
B9Id. at 727, 278 P.2d at 329.
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session. It would appear that all confusion as to required intention has
ended, and that the future pattern will be one of precision.
WILLIAM J. POWELL
Community Property-Validity of Antenuptial Agreement Alter-
ing Status of Property Acquired after Marriage. In Htamlin v. Mer-
lino,4 ° husband and wife entered into an antenuptial agreement pro-
viding, among other things, that all property acquired after marriage
should become the separate property of the one in whose name the
property was taken. When the wife died, the husband, as adminis-
trator, filed an inventory of her estate showing the sole asset to be a
bank account of $847. Shortly thereafter the plaintiff was appointed
as administrator with will annexed. He sought to have all property
acquired after marriage declared to be community property, subject
to administration. Defendant contended that all such property was
his separate property by operation of the antenuptial agreement. The
trial court dismissed the suit, and the plaintiff appealed. On appeal,
all property except that traceable to assets owned by the husband
before marriage was declared to be community property. The agree-
ment was held to be void for lack of fairness to the wife, since the
husband's statutory" position as manager of the community would
enable him, under this agreement, to put all of the property in his own
name, thus making it his separate property.
The court adopted the rule as stated in Juhasz v. Juhasz,"2 where it
was held that ".. . An engagement to marry creates a confidential re-
lationship between the contracting parties and an antenuptial agree-
ment entered into after the engagement and during its pendency must
be attended by the utmost good faith. . . ." This corresponds to the
general rule" and the Washington rule" regarding contracts between
husband and wife after marriage. In applying this rule, the court has set
a standard that must be met in order to sustain an antenuptial agree-
ment altering the status of property that would ordinarily be commu-
40 44 Wn2d 851, 272 P2d 125 (1954).
41 RCW 26.16.030, which gives husband power to dispose of community property
the same as if it were separate property.
42 134 Ohio St. 257, 16 N.E.2d 328 (1938).
43 POMEROY, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 955, 956, 957, 962b (5th ed. 1941). The gist
of these sections is that between husband and wife there is a confidential relationship
and that in such relationships, courts will examine any transactions affecting property
rights-the burden being on the party seeking to sustain the agreement to prove that it
is fair and entered into with full knowledge of all relevant facts.
44 See, for example, In re Madden's Estate, 176 Wash. 51, 28 P.2d 280 (1934), where
the court cited POMEROY, op. cit. supra note 43.
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nity property. Though this is the first direct holding by the court on the
precise issue involved, it is not a surprising one. The rule applied in
this case is the general rule in almost any case where there is a con-
fidential relation between the parties," and also follows the weight of
authority as to antenuptial agreements in particular.?'
LAYTON A. PowER
Landlord and Tenant-Lease with Covenant to Rebuild-Extent
of Duty to Rebuild. In McFerren v. Heroux'7 the Washington
Supreme Court awarded the lessor .damages for the lessee and his
assignee's breach of a covenant to rebuild, holding that a structure
reasonably similar in kind and proportion to that destroyed was re-
quired. This is in accord with the accepted meaning of "rebuild' 8
and a prior Washington decision.'9 From -the definition of a covenant
to rebuild, the logical assumption of the measure of damages would be
thq cost of rebuilding the structure. (in this case a grandstand approxi-
mately 20 years old) as it existed prior to its destruction. However,
the court awarded damages based on the cost of a new grandstand,
not one 20 years old.
Before looking at this feature of the case, several provisions of this
unique lease should be examined closely. To begin with, the lessor
owned nothing but the ground while the lessee owned the buildings
and improvements, which consisted of a covered, wooden grandstand.
No rental other than the payment of taxes was specified, but the lessor
was given an option to purchase all buildings. and improvements on
the land at the end of the ten year term for $5,000. 0 The lessee was
not required to keep the buildings in repair, carry fire insurance,. or
make any improvements. In the event of a fire. doing more than $500
'45 Pommoy, op. cit. supra note 43.
46 Juhasz v. Juhasz, supra note 42; In re Flannery's Estate, 315 Pa. 576, 173 Ad. 303
(1934) ; In re Waller's Estate, 116 Neb. 352, 217 N.W. 588 (1928) ; Debolt v. Black-
burn, 328 Ill. 420, 159 N.E. 790 (1928) ; Harlin v. Harlin, 261 Ky. 414, 87 S.W2d 937
(1935) ; In re Enyart's Estate, 100 Neb. 337, 160 N.W. 120 (1916). Though these
cases are not from community property states, the principle is the same; that a valid
antenuptial agreement must be fair or entered into with full knowledge of the facts.
47 44 Wn2d 631, 269 P.2d 815 (1954). See also Evdence at page 147.
48 Webster's New International Dictionary (Unabridged), 2nd edition; 36 WoRDs
AND PHRASEs 426; 75 CJ.S. 639 (1952).
49 Cf. Seattle v. Northern Pacific Co., 12 Wn2d 247, 254; 121 P2d 382, 385 (1942).
5o The court found this to be the real consideration for the lease, rejecting the
lessee's contention that the consideration was the dismissal of his suit for specific
performance of a contract to convey the same tract of land brought against the lessor's
vendor.
51 However, the lessee did carry $60,000 fire insurance.
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damage, the lessee was given an option to either rebuild or surrender
the lease.
After the grandstand was destroyed by fire, with exactly five years
remaining-on the lease, the lessee elected to rebuild and later assigned
the lease,52 the lease being assignable subject to its terms. His assignees
erected two uncovered, portable grandstands costing approximately
$25,000. The trial court held this to be a breach of the covenant to
rebuild, but awarded only nominal damages on the ground damages
were speculative since the lease did not require that the grandstand
be kept in repair and there was, therefore, no assurance that it would
be in existence at the end of the term. The Supreme Court reversed
and at the same time granted damages" based on the present value of
a new grandstand" at the end of the lease55 less the option price of
$5,000.56
No case or text has been found in which the lessor sued his lessee or
his lessee's assignees for damages for breach of a "straight" covenant
to rebuild (one in which the lessee covenants to rebuild in the event
of destruction by fire or other casualty), as distinguished from an
unconditional covenant to repair or to return the property in as good
condition was in when received. The rule at common law and the rule
in Washington today is that the latter covenants obligate the lessee
to rebuild the buildings or improvements leased in the event of de-
struction by fire or other casualty during the term." They represent
the closest analogy that can be drawn to the "straight" covenant to
rebuild as found in the instant case. There are numerous cases, both
in this and other jurisdictions, that have considered the problems
presented by the analogous covenants. In almost all of them the sole
question has been whether there was an obligation to rebuild. Rarely
52 The assignees agreed to hold the assignor harmless.
53 In a five to four decision the court granted a new trial on the question of damages
where the trial court found the plaintiff suffered substantial damages as a result of
defendant's breach of contract but awarded only nominal damages. Gilmartin v.
Stevens Investment Co., 43 Wn2d 289, 261 P.2d 73 (1953). However, in that case,
plaintiff's witnesses gave conflicting estimates as to the amount of damages. Here, the
cost of rebuilding was uncontradicted.
54 Trial court's oral decision, p. 116 of the trial transcript: "old grandstand... was
a structure worth $103,000--at the time of construction."
55 The court, of its own accord, took judicial notice of the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment's Bulletin F-Schedule of Depreciation, and held the grandstand would have a
useful life of 15 years.56 Thus, the court held the option had been exercised and at the end of the lease the
lessor would be entitled to all buildings and improvements on the land except the
grandstand.
5T Publishers Building Co. v. Miller, 25 Wn.2d 927, 938; 172 P2d 489, 495 (1946);
Anderson v. Ferguson, 17 Wn.2d 262, 271; 135 P.2d 302, 306 (1943); 20 A.L.R.2d
1344, 1353 (1951).
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has it been argued that ,the obligation is only to .rebuild in the same
condition as existed prior to destruction. The few courts 8 and text
writers'! who have- considered the question have all held the measure
of damages for breach of the covenant to be the cost of rebuilding
the structure as it existed immediately prior to its destruction, and
not the cost of a new building. An example will explain the distinction.
Suppose a lessee rents a house worth $5,000 today, but which originally
cost $10,000 to build. Under the terms of the lease, he would be
obligated to rebuild in case of destruction by casualty. When the house
is destroyed by fire and the lessee fails to rebuild, can one logically
argue that the lessor has been damaged $10,000 when the house was
only worth $5,000 at the time it was destroyed? Yet that is what the
Washington court has done in McFerren v. Heroux, although, as will
be seen, this distinction was not argued before the court.
It is submitted that the Washington court has never ruled directly
on the question. There are numerous cases in which the obligation of
the lessee or his assignee to repair or rebuild arising out of the par-
ticular covenant has been decided,"0 but all of them involved situations
where the lessee covenanted to keep the buildings or improvements in
repair. In the instant case the lessee was not required to keep the
grandstand in repair since it was his personal property until the lessor
exercised his option to purchase it. This suggests a possible distinction
between the cases. It was on this ground that the trial court awarded
only nominal damages, but the Supreme Court found that the obligation
arose from the lessee's exercise of the option to rebuild. The assignees
were bound since they assumed the covenants of the lease. Only once
in the Washington cases has it been argued that the lessee or his
assignee should be required to pay only part of the cost.", This was
on the ground that the boiler would last longer than the lease, not that
the lessee was required to pay for something new while what was
destroyed was old. In another case the lessee and his assignee were
3sMarcy v. City of Syracuse, 199 App. Div. 246, 192 N.Y.Supp. 674 (1921),
noted in 45 A.L.R. 21, 35; Sweezy v. Collins Northern Ice Co., 171 Mich. 81, 137
N.W. 84 (1912).
59 3 SUTHEL.AND, DAMAGES § 855 at 3150, § 858 at 3164 (4th ed. 1916) ; 3 SEDGWICK,
DAMAGES § 999h at 2080 (9th ed. 1912).60Puget Investment Co. v. Wencl, 36 Wn.2d 817, 221 P.2d 456 (1950), noted in
20 A.L.R.2d 1320 (1951); Publishers Building Co. v. Miller, .supra note 11; Anderson
v. Ferguson, supra note 57; Yakima Valley Motors v. Webb Tractor and Equipment
Co., 14 Wn2d 468, 128 P2d 507 (1942) ; Delano v. Tennent 138 Wash. 39, 244 Pac.
273 (1926) ; Arnold-Evans Co. v. Hardung, 132 Wash. 426, 232 Pac. 290 (1925) ; Arm-
strong v. Maybee, 17 Wash. 24, 48 Pac. 737 (1897).
"I Arnold-Evans Co. v. Hardung, supra note 60.
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required to pay damages to repair that which was destroyed.82 In no
case has it ever been contended that the measure of damages for failure
to rebuild or repair was the cost of rebuilding or repairing that which
was destroyed as it existed immediately prior to destruction.
The result of McFerran v. Heroux has been reached in Washington
as well as almost all jurisdictions because the counsel for the lessee or
his assignee argues only whether there is an obligation to rebuild at all
as distinguished from what is required to be rebuilt. The issue, not
having been raised at the trial level, naturally cannot be assigned as
error on the appeal. Consequently, the case was correctly decided by
the Supreme Court as it was presented to them, but analytically it is
not sound and does not stand for the proposition that a covenant to
rebuild requires a new structure rather than one in the same condition
as that destroyed. The measure of damages should be the cost of
rebuilding a grandstand in the same condition as the one destroyed."
WILLIAM M. RoBINsON
Real Property-Future Interests-Restraints on Alienation. In Richardson v. Danson,
44 Wn2d 760, 270 P.2d 802 (1954), testator devised certain land to his nephew Clar-
ence, "Subject, however, to the following conditions: That [he] shall have the use
and occupancy and right to farm such land and the income therefrom during the period
of twenty years from the date of my death; Provided, however, that he pay all taxes
and assessments levied thereon during such twenty year period, and provided that such
land shall not be sold or encumbered .. . during such period of twenty years." Heirs
at law who were not named in the will brought a declaratory judgment proceeding for
construction of the will. Held: the provision was a condition subsequent; such condi-
tion was void as an illegal restraint on alienation; nephew Clarence, the devisee, took
a fee simple. The law favors early vesting of estates, and conditions subsequent are
preferred in construction, especially when the form is that of condition subsequent.
The court accepted the majority rule that any restraint on alienation is void, no matter
how short, since it is repugnant to the nature of a fee and contrary to public policy.
See also Equity at page 142.
Real Property-Boundaries--Conflicting Land Descriptions in Deeds. Fowler v.
Tarbet, 145 Wash. Dec. 309, 274 P.2d 341 (1954) was an action to settle a boundary
dispute caused by conflicting land descriptions in a deed. The land conveyed was
described in the deed as being 8.95 acres lying in a described lot and "being 2 acres in
width.... ." The court held that since metes and bounds control over quantity descrip-
tion when there is disagreement between the two, the term "acre" had a clear and
definite meaning only if construed to mean the distance along one side of a square
62 Publishers Building Co. v. Miller, supra note 57.
68 A unique factor in the instant case not found in cases involving covenants to
repair or keep in "good condition" was the lack of any duty to rebuild unless the lessee
decided voluntarily to do so after the destruction. The hardship that might exist where
there is an absolute pre-arranged duty to rebuild-and to which a court may give a
sympathetic ear in determining the damages-is not prevalent where one has such an
election.
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acre, or 208.7 feet. This construction made the area conveyed 7.97 acres, and the excess
quantity described was treated as surplusage. Acre has always been known as a
quantity description, originally the amount plowed by a yoke of oxen in a day; then
under the statutes of Edward I, Edward III and Henry VIII, the area of a piece
40 poles long by 4 broad, or 160 square rods. See Webster's New International Dic-
tionary (2d ed. 1948). Ancient cases at King's Bench held an acre to be 160 square rods
of land in whatever shape. Co. Litt. 5b. Giving new meaning to words is sometimes
part of the process by which courts achieve justice in their historic function of
arbitrating personal disputes. In this instance the solution was to construe an acre as
a unit of lineal measurement.
Real Property-Easements-Public Road by Prescription. In Todd v. Sterling, 145
Wash. Dec. 37, 273 P2d 245 (1954), plaintiff sought to establish a public road by
prescription across what was now defendant's field. The road had been used by various
settlers from 1907 to 1919, and had then been across vacant, unenclosed and wild land.
Hunters, sheepmen, etc., had occasionally used the road until 1945 when the area. was
resettled and defendant acquired the wild land and put it to cultivation. Plaintiff was
unable to show who had been the owner of the wild land during the alleged prescriptive
period of 1907 to 1919. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed.. The court held that in
the usual case of prescriptive public roads, adverse user will be implied from a showing
that such user was open, notorious, continuous and over a uniform route. No such
inference will be made where the servient land is vacant, open, unenclosed and un-
improved. In such cases, adverse user must be specifically proved. This, plaintiff was
unable to do since he could not show who was owner. The presumption remained that
the use was permissive. It is not clear where the shift of presumption occurs, but it is
somewhere between the situations where there is no use made of the land and where
some use or improvement is made.
Real Property-Life Estates-Liability of Life Tenant for Repairs. In In re Brooks'
Estate, 44 Wn2d 96, 265 P2d 833 (1954) an executrix repaired the roof and remodeled
the interior of a building in which she had been granted a life estate by the will of her
decedent. In her final report, the executrix attempted to charge the remainderman with
half the cost of the repairs, this litigation resulting. The trial court allowed apportion-
ment. This was reversed on appeal, the court stating that "The cost of repairs and
voluntary improvements must be borne by the life tenant in the absence of consent by
the remainderman to be liable therefor." Stahl v. Schwartz, 81 Wash. 293, 142 Par.
651 (1914) is the only previous case involving the question of apportionment. The
same rule was stated there. Practically universal authority supports the rule, with one
general exception where improvements are compelled by governmental authority. The
life tenant-executrix in the Brooks case was 72 years old, and the argument was
advanced that there was reasonable probability that the remainderman would benefit
from the improvements. This argument was rejected by the court in favor of the
general rule. RESTATEmNT, PROPERTY § 127, comment a- (1948 Supplement) suggests
that this is an evolving area of the law and that some equitable arguments are gaining
acceptance. But no case has yet allowed apportionment without greater mitigating
circumstances than were proved in the Brooks case. The court indicated that it will
not be readily inclined to make exceptions to the general rule of no apportionment.
Personal Property-Abandonment-Limitation of Actions. In Jones v. Jacobson,
145 Wash. Dec. 245, 273 P.2d 979 (1954), the plaintiff sued for the alleged conversion
of a piece of machinery known as a "logging donkey." The defendant had found the
donkey on his land when he purchased and took possession of the land in 1944; and
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after eight years of unavailing inquiries as to the ownership of the donkey, he sold it
for junk. In the meantime, through mesne conveyances, the plaintiff had acquired title
to the machine. None of the transferees had ever attempted to take possession of the
donkey, nor had any of their bills of sale been recorded. On trial of the case, the
defendant pleaded the statute of limitations and also defended on the ground that the
machine had been abandoned. Judgment was for the defendant and the plaintiff ap-
pealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court had some difficulty with the case. In addition
to the majority opinion, there were three opinions concurring in the result and one
dissent. The majority chose to decide the case on the statute of limitations argument,
making no holding on the issue of abandonment. It was held that the statute began to
run when plaintiff first became entitled to sue; that he became entitled to sue when
the donkey came to rest on defendant's property; that adverse possession in the de-
fendant was not necessary; and that no demand was necessary, since this would give
the plaintiff the power to toll the statute by simply refraining from making a demand.
Personal Property-Necessity of Demand Prior to Replevin Action. In Friendly
Finance Corp. v. Koster, 145 Wash. Dec. 348, 274 P2d 586 (1954), the assignee of
the vendor's interest in an automobile sold on a conditional sales contract brought a
replevin action against the assignee of the vendee's interest. The defendant in this
replevin action admitted plaintiff's right to the car, but defended on the ground that
plaintiff had made no demand before instituting suit. Judgment for the plaintiff was
affirmed. The court held that since the plaintiff's right to the car was admitted, that
issue in this case was a moot question. The effect of a reversal, said the court, would
simply require the plaintiff to make a demand and bring another action, against which
the defendant admits he has no defense.
SALES
Avoidance of Disclaimer by Action For Fraudulent Misrepresentation. In Aiyquist v.
Foster, 44 Wn2d 442, 268 P.2d 442 (1954), the plaintiff brought an action based upon
fraudulent misrepresentations of the vendor of a trailer. Allegedly the vendor stated
that the sides of the trailer would not warp when exposed to moisture. When the
trailer sides did warp, and the vendor refused the return of the trailer, the vendee sued
to rescind. The action was for misrepresentation due to the inclusion in the sale con-
tract of a disclaimer clause which prevented any type of warranty action. The case
turned upon the question of whether the statements made by the vendor were state-
ments of existing facts, or mere matters of opinion. In holding for the vendee, the
court announced the general rule that a statement concerning a quality which existed
in the chattel at the time that the statement was made is a statement of an existing fact
unless the statement relates to the ability of the chattel to serve a particular use of the
vendee, or unless the satisfaction of the thing represented depends upon the performance
of a future act or the occurance of a future event. See Comment, Avoidance of Dis-
claimer by Action for Fraudulent Misrepresentation, 30 W&sn. L. Rxv. 54 (1955).
TAXATION
Employment Security Act-Applicability to Home Freezer Salesmen. In McIntyre
v. Bates, 145 Wash. Dec. 41, 272 P.2d 618 (1954), the Court held that persons engaged
in direct selling of home freezers under a so-called "food plan" fall within the scope of
the Washington Employment Security Act. The Court found the taxpayer to be an
"employer" within the meaning of RCW 50.04.080 and determined that the salesmen
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